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Abstract
Many countries have relied on subsidies to promote the adoption of renewable en-
ergy technologies. We study a generous program to promote the adoption of solar
photovoltaic (PV) systems through subsidies on future electricity production, rather
than through upfront investment subsidies. We develop and estimate a tractable dy-
namic model of technology adoption, also accounting for local market heterogeneity.
We exploit rich variation at pre-announced dates in the future production subsidies.
Although the program led to a massive adoption, we nd that households signicantly
undervalued the future benets from the new technology. This implies that an upfront
investment subsidy program would have promoted the technology at a much lower bud-
getary cost, so that the government essentially shifted the subsidy burden to future
generations of electricity consumers. (JEL C51, Q48, Q58)
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1 Introduction
Many countries have relied on subsidies to promote the adoption of renewable energy tech-
nologies for electricity production, such as wind power and solar photovoltaic (PV) systems.
The generous support has often been motivated on the grounds that there is not only an
environmental externality (CO2 emissions from fossil sources), but also a technology market
failure (insu¢ cient incentives to innovate and adopt a new technology). The subsidies for
the green technologies often consist of a combination of investment subsidies, which are paid
upfront at the moment of installation, and production subsidies, which are paid in the future
when the systems are producing the electricity (or equivalently, a combination of investment
and production tax credits, as reviewed for the U.S. in Murray et al. (2014)).
In this paper we investigate the incentive to adopt a new green technology, and the role
played by investment and production subsidies. The adoption decision involves a fundamen-
tal trade-o¤ between the immediate investment costs and the future benets from electricity
production. The successful adoption of the new technology thus depends on how much
households discount future benets, and on the extent to which subsidies apply to the up-
front investment costs or the future electricity production. We study a generous program for
residential solar PV systems, running in the region of Flanders (Northern part of Belgium)
during 20062012, and responsible for a particularly high adoption rate compared with other
countries.1 The program heavily relied on future production subsidies in the form of Green
Current Certicates (GCCs), which were committed for up to 20 years. The program was
similar to the German and several other European programs but it di¤ered from the U.S.
programs, which more heavily relied on upfront investment subsidies or rebates.2 Interest-
ingly, the GCC subsidy program revised its conditions many times at pre-announced dates.
The considerable variation in the subsidies enables us to identify the householdsdiscount
factor in a reliable way. Because the program mainly consisted of future production subsidies
instead of upfront investment subsidies, it potentially enabled the government to shift the
nancial burden to future electricity consumers. Based on the estimated discount factor, we
can assess how costly this was.
1Belgium ranked 3rd in the European Union with a total capacity of 240 Watt peak/capita at the end of
2012 (Eurobserver 2013), mostly due to the adoption in Flanders. According to our own calculations, total
capacity in Flanders reached 318 Watt peak/capita at the end of 2012, which is the second highest after
Germany with 399.5 Watt peak/capita.
2In the U.S. there were federal tax credits of 30%, and several states took additional measures. For
example, the famous California Solar Initiative (CSI) had a budget of $2.2 billion and aimed to install
1.9GW of solar PV capacity. Combined with the federal tax credits, the investment subsidies could amount
to 50% of the cost of a solar PV system. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Solar_Initiative.
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To estimate the impact of the subsidy program, we develop a dynamic discrete choice
model, where in each period households face the decision to adopt the new technology or
to postpone their investment. We estimate a dynamic technology adoption model based on
aggregate, country-level data. Our estimation approach is similar to Scott (2013), but we
exploit data on investment costs and expected future benets to identify and estimate the
discount factor. We also show how to extend the model to account for rich forms of local
market heterogeneity in a tractable way.
We obtain the following main ndings. First, although the program led to a massive
adoption of solar PV systems, households signicantly undervalued the future benets from
the new technology. They use a implicit real interest rate of 13% in evaluating these future
benets, which is much above the real market interest rate of about 3%. Put di¤erently,
this implies a considerable undervaluation of the future benets from electricity production:
consumers are only willing to pay approximately 0:5 euro upfront for one euro of discounted
future benets from electricity production. Our nding of undervaluation is robust with
respect to various assumptions, such as political uncertainty on the program. The consider-
able consumer myopia in technology adoption raises specic policy concerns, at least from
a budgetary and distributional perspective. The government could have saved 46% or e 1:7
billion by giving upfront investment subsidies instead of future production subsidies. This
is a saving of almost e 700 per Flemish household, a very large number given that only
8:3% of the households had adopted a PV at the end of the program. We conclude that the
government paid a high cost in shifting the subsidy burden to future households, as they pay
for the subsidy through higher electricity prices.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the empirical intertem-
poral choice literature, which studies how consumers value future payo¤s. Much of this work
focuses on the important question whether there is consumer myopia or inattention in the
valuation of future energy cost savings, as this could be responsible for the so-called energy
e¢ ciency gap (Allcott and Greenstone (2012)). After Hausmans (1979) seminal contribu-
tion, the recent evidence ranges from moderate undervaluation to correct valuation, see for
example Allcott and Wozny (2014) and Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2013). All this
evidence is based on energy-saving investments of existing, mature technologies (such as
cars). This paper instead focuses on the decision to adopt an entirely new technology, which
aims to obtain a shift from traditional energy sources to renewables. Our evidence suggests
that consumer myopia is much stronger in this case, with important implications for policy
programs.
Second, because we focus on the adoption decision of a new technology we also make
a methodological contribution. Other empirical work on consumers valuation of future
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payo¤s typically ignores the timing dimension of adoption. It focuses on the decision of how
much to invest in energy cost savings, without accounting for the option value of waiting.
This approach may be reasonable for mature technologies where households simply replace
their current products. However, it is unrealistic in new markets when new energy-saving
technologies are just introduced, when prices are quickly decreasing and quality is increasing.
In these circumstances, consumers do not only face a traditional investment problem. They
also must decide on the timing of their investment, as it can be benecial to postpone
adoption even if it is already protable to invest now.
To incorporate the timing decision, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model that
captures the optimal stopping problem in the spirit of Rust (1987). The discount factor now
plays a double role: it inuences both how much households value the future benets of
their investments, and how much they are prepared to wait for better investment opportu-
nities. The rst is inherent in every investment decision, but does not necessitate the use of
a dynamic model as it can treated as a static model with discounted benets. The second
is particularly important for new technologies as they are often characterized by increasing
quality and decreasing prices. This aspect does require a dynamic model. The dynamic
discrete choice literature has stressed that the discount factor is not identied without addi-
tional restrictions; see Manski (1993), Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002). In our
setting we obtain identication by assuming the discount factor that weigh investment costs
against future benets is the same as the discount factor for the timing decision to adopt. We
thus obtain identication from variation in the investment costs and future benets across
product varieties and over time, as in traditional investment situations where households
do not face an option value of waiting. Although this is common in static choice models,
it has not yet been applied in dynamic models where the discount factor plays this double
role. Our particular identication strategy relies on the large variation in investment costs,
combined with the considerable variation in the GCC subsidies, which were revised many
times on pre-announced dates.
Third, we contribute by proposing a novel method to estimate a dynamic technology
adoption model with aggregate data, and we also show how to extend the model to account
for local market heterogeneity in a tractable way. We follow several steps. In a rst step,
we make use of Hotz and Millers (1993) inversion approach, which writes the ex ante value
function as the utility of choosing one alternative, plus a correction term. We exploit the
fact that technology adoption is a terminating action in our setting (see Arcidiacono and
Ellickson (2011) for a particularly clear exposition). Similar to Scott (2013), we write the
expected next period value function as the realized value function plus a prediction error,
which is uncorrelated with any variables known by the household at the time of the adoption
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decision. In a second step, we show how to invert the demand model to solve for the
unobserved error term, using a similar approach as in Berry (1994) for static choice models.
Conditional on the discount factor, this gives rise to a linear regression equation, where
the current adoption rate depends on current and next period prices, as well as the next
period adoption rate. One can use a standard nonlinear GMM estimator to also estimate
the discount factor and account for the endogeneity of several variables. In a third step, we
add suitable micro-moments to also account for rich forms of household heterogeneity at a
very disaggregate local market level (with on average only 295 households per local market).3
We include demographic variables, interacted with the price and capacity size, and a rich set
of local market xed e¤ects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Although these controls
are important in explaining adoption behavior, they do not a¤ect our conclusions for the
discount factor, and our policy implications.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the datasets, the solar
PV technology, the most important policy measures to promote PV adoption in Flanders,
and takes a rst look at the evolution of adoption and costs and benets. Section 3 species
the model that can be estimated with only aggregate data, and also its extension to account
for local market heterogeneity. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, performs a detailed
sensitivity analysis and derives policy implications. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
2 Industry background
In this section we describe the market of residential photovoltaic (PV) systems. We begin
with a brief description of the available datasets. We then discuss the technology and the
various sources of costs and benets of installing PV systems. Finally, we provide descriptive
statistics on the magnitude of the costs and benets during the considered period, and on
the evolution of the number of adopters of the new technology.4
2.1 Datasets
Our main dataset contains information of all installed PVs across Flanders during 2006
2012. We will analyze this dataset at the monthly frequency, rst at the aggregate level of
Flanders (covering about 2:7 million households) and in an extension at the disaggregate
3Other dynamic adoption models with aggregate data have ignored persistent heterogeneity (Melnikov
2013), or allowed for it through random coe¢ cients (Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012)) or unobservable
types in the population (Scott 2013).
4External sources that were used for the policy overview and the database creation are listed in the
appendix.
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local area level (which divides the entire region in 9,182 statistical sectors, with an average
of 295 households per statistical sector).
We combine the information from this main dataset with several additional datasets.
First, we collected information on the prices of PV systems from May 2009 until December
2012. Second, we have information on the benets from adopting PVs, including the public
support measures in the form of Green Current Certicates (GCCs), electricity cost savings
from net metering, and tax benets. Finally, for our extension to the disaggregate local
market level, we collected detailed socio-demographic information, such as income, household
and house characteristics. In the Appendix we provide further details on the data sources
and the data construction.
2.2 Technology and public support measures
A PV system consists of solar panels, which absorb sunlight and convert this into electricity.
One can distinguish between residential and commercial PV systems. Residential PV systems
are usually installed on top of a roof and typically have a capacity size no larger than 10
kilowatt (kW). Commercial PV systems may also be on the top of a roof or they may be
grount-mounted, and they generally reach much larger capacity sizes than residential PV
systems.
Our focus is on residential PV systems, with capacity limited to 10 kW. In Flanders, a
PV system produces 0.85 MWh per year for each kW of capacity (CREG 2010). All resi-
dential PV systems are connected to the grid, so that households do not need to synchronize
their electricity consumption and production, or use batteries to store excess production.
Households pay an upfront investment price for a PV system, and they receive two main
sources of future benets from installing a PV system: Green Current Certicates (GCCs)
and electricity bill savings from net-metering. We discuss these elements in turn.
Investment price The investment price is the price households have to pay for a PV sys-
tem, including all additional costs. This mainly depends on the capacity, measured in kW.
In 2006 and 2007 households could apply for a 10% investment subsidy for PV installations.5
Furthermore, there was a general tax credit of 40% for renewable energy investments, includ-
ing PV installations. The maximum allowed tax credit varied over the period, ranging from
e 1,200 in 2006 to e 3,600 in 2011 (and since 2009 households could transfer the remaining
amount to the following three years if their house was built at least ve years ago). In 2012
5The subsidizable investment cost was capped at 7000e per kWp and a maximum subsidizable capacity
of 3kW.
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the tax credits for PV installations were abolished. Finally, PV installations that were built
in houses of at least ve years old also beneted from a reduced VAT rate of 6% instead of
21%.
Subsidies from Green Current Certicates (GCCs) The Flemish government has
actively promoted the adoption of PV systems through the program of tradable GCCs.
Households obtained a GCC for eachMWh of electricity production through their PV system,
and they could sell these to the distribution system operators (DSOs) at a guaranteed price
for a xed number of years. This guaranteed price was substantially above the market price
of GCCs. At the start in 2006, the program was very generous, paying e450 per MWh for 20
years. The program became less favorable in 2010, and was subsequently gradually phased
out. By the end of 2012, new PV systems only received a guaranteed price of e90 per MWh
for a period of 10 years. In January 2013, the government introduced a so-called banding
factor. This restricted the number of GCCs per MWh, and e¤ectively led to an abolishment
of the entire GCC system in February 2014.6
From the point of view of PV adopters, the GCCs are a subsidy for future electricity
production. The DSOs were responsible to buy these GCCs at the contracted price. They
subsequently resell them at the prevailing market price to the electricity suppliers, who are
required to purchase a su¢ cient amount every year to meet their renewable energy sources
requirements. The GCCs are thus a cost to both the DSOs and the electricity suppliers, and
these costs are eventually passed on to retail electricity prices. As such, the GCC subsidy
scheme is not nanced through taxes, but rather through increased electricity prices to all
consumers.
Electricity cost savings from net metering Households with a PV system with a
capacity limited to 10 kW benet from a net-metering principle. This means that they
only have to pay for their net annual electricity consumption, i.e. their consumption after
subtracting the annual electricity production generated by their PV system and transmitted
on the grid.7 Hence, in addition to the subsidies from GCCs, a second main source of
benets from installing a PV system is given by the annual electricity bill savings, i.e. the
PVs annual electricity production multiplied by the retail price of electricity.
6The idea of the banding factor was to limit the number of GCCs for every produced MWh, in such a
way that the net present value of installing a PV would essentially be zero at the prevailing market prices of
PV systems. Since the prices of PV systems continued to drop, the net present value soon became positive
even without GCCs, so that GCCs were e¤ectively abolished in February 2014.
7Note that there is no reimbursement in case a household would produce more electricity than it consumes
on an annual basis.
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Access to the grid was initially o¤ered without any charge. In July 2015, the DSOs were
able to introduce an annual grid fee of around 100e/kW. This came after a long public
debate and several legislative procedures. The grid fee enabled the DSOs to partly nance
their cost of the GCC subsidies, aiming to avoid further electricity price increases to all
consumers.
2.3 Evolution of costs, benets and adoption
Figure 2 summarizes of the costs and benets of a PV system of 4kW. We calculate future
Figure 1: Costs and benets of 4kW PV in EUR 2013, discounted at market interest rate
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Figure 2:
benets in present value terms using a real interest rate of 3% and an expected life time
of 20 years and we convert all prices to 2013 prices. The gross purchase price (net of any
investment tax cuts) dropped from e 21,700 in May 2009 to e 8,791 at the end of 2012.8.
8The price data we collected starts in May 2009. We therefore also estimate the model from May 2009
on. For descriptive purposes, we also show a predicted price variable in Figure 2 (based on the German price
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The present value of future benets was highest in 2009 and rapidly decreased afterwards.
The most important benets came from the GCCs. They provided a present value of e
20,000 until January 2010, and subsequently declined until they almost disappeared at the
end of 2012. Benets from tax cuts were also high, especially from 2009 on, but they
were removed in 2012. Finally, the benets from net-metering (i.e. electricity cost savings)
formed a fairly stable source of benets. These benets became the most important reason to
adopt PVs since the end of 2012, but only because other benet components decreased over
time. A comparison of the total benets (shaded area) with total costs (black line) shows
that adoption was protable during the entire period in net present value terms, especially
between 2009 and the middle of 2012.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the monthly number of new adopters between January
2006 and December 2012. Vertical lines indicate drops in the GCC prices, as typically
Figure 3: 2006-2012: Time series of new PV adoptions and drops in nominal GCC price
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Figure 4:
announced a few months in advance. Despite the positive gap between benets and costs
throughout the sample, the number of new adopters remained very low until 2009. This
may be because households did not fully value the benets or because they postponed their
index).
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adoption in anticipation of better future investment opportunities. From 2009 onwards
the number of new adopters started to increase to reach a sharp peak just before the rst
announced drop in the GCC price in January 2010. There was again a gradual increase in
the number of adopters in 2010 with a new peak just before the second drop in the GCC
price in January 2011. The same pattern of gradual increases and peaks just before a next
announced drop in the GCC price has been repeated several times until the beginning of
2013 when the GCC policy changed drastically and became less generous. This adoption
pattern illustrates the dynamic nature of the householdsdecision problem to adopt a PV
installation. Households postpone the adoption of a PV to wait for prices to drop, but they
also anticipate the announced drop in the GCC price and thus in the expected benets of
their investment.
Figure 5 shows the cumulative number of adopters over the considered period, broken
down into ve groups of capacity size: 2kW, 4kW, 6kW, 8kW and 10kW. This shows a
Figure 5: 2006-2012: Time series of total adoption of PVs of di¤erent capacity
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gradual long-term increase in the number of adopters, with several kink points around the
time of new GCC schemes. The 4kW and 6kW systems were the most popular choices for
a PV. This is because households only benet from net-metering for the production that is
below their household consumption. In practice, an average household consumes 3.5MWh
per year, while a 4kW system produces about 3.4 MWh per year, so that larger PV systems
are only of value for households that are su¢ ciently larger than average. Nevertheless,
there is a modest shift during the period towards PV systems of larger capacity: whereas in
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January 2010 the market share of PV systems of 8kW and 10kW was only 12%, it reached
18 % by 2013.
By the end of 2012, the cumulative number of adopters had reached 220; 464, amounting
to an adoption rate of 8:3% of the households (or 8:4% of the number of buildings). The
total capacity of residential PV systems had at that time reached 1; 057MW, or 5% of total
electricity capacity in Belgium.9
Adoption rates vary widely within the region, as illustrated in Figure 6. Adoption rates
are very high (over 20%) in rural areas often in the west and east parts of the region.
Conversely, adoption rates are extremely small in cities such as Ghent (west of center) and
Antwerp (north of center), or the areas around Brussels (south of center). Various socio-
demographic factors may explain this variation, such as average household size, house size
and income. In an extension of our aggregate demand model, we will take into account the
role of these socio-demographic characteristics.
Figure 6: PV adoption rates in Flanders
Adoption data: VREG, household data: ADSEI census 2011
3 The model of technology adoption
We rst specify a dynamic adoption model that can be estimated with aggregate market data:
we describe to adoption decision (subsection 3.1), derive the estimating equation (subsection
3.2) and discuss estimation and identication (subsection 3.3). We subsequently show how
to extend the approach to estimate the model at a highly disaggregate local market level.
This makes it possible to account for heterogeneity across households (subsection 3.4).
9According to the US Energy Information Administration, Belgium had a total installed electrical capacity
of 21,000 MW in 2012.
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3.1 The adoption decision
In a given period t a household i = 1; : : : ; N may either choose not to adopt a PV, j = 0, or
it may choose to adopt one of the available PV alternatives, j = 1; : : : ; J . In our application,
the PV alternatives refer to systems with di¤erent capacity sizes. A key feature of the model
is that the adoption decision (j 6= 0) is a terminating action. Not adopting (j = 0) gives the
option of adopting at a later period, when the price for a given size may have decreased, or
when the nancial benets may have increased or decreased.
In each period a household obtains a random taste shock "i;j;t, which we assume to follow
a type I extreme value distribution. Let vi;j;t be the conditional value of household i for
alternative j at period t, i.e. the expected discounted utility from choosing j at t before the
realization of the random taste shock "i;j;t. In general, one can decompose vi;j;t = j;t+i;j;t,
where j;t is the mean utility and i;j;t is the individual-specic utility. In this subsection,
we set i;j;t = 0, so that vi;j;t = j;t. Household heterogeneity then only enters through the
extreme value term "i;j;t.
Assume that in each period t households choose the alternative j that maximizes random
utility vi;j;t + "i;j;t. This will give rise to a choice probability, or approximately an aggregate
market share, for each alternative j in each period t. Before deriving this, we rst describe the
conditional value of adoption (vi;j;t, j = 1; : : : ; J) and the conditional value of not adopting
(vi;0;t) in period t.
Conditional value of adoption (vi;j;t, j = 1; : : : ; J)
The conditional value of adoption is particularly simple because it is the expected discounted
utility of a terminating action, after which the household no longer takes any actions. We
specify vi;j;t as follows:
vi;j;t = j;t = xj;t   pj;t + j;t (1)
where xj;t is a vector of characteristics of alternative j at period t, pj;t = pj;t () is the price
variable as a function of the monthly discount factor , and j;t is the unobserved quality
of alternative j at period t. In our specication, xj;t will contain a set of xed e¤ects for
the alternatives, a time trend and seasonal dummy variables. The price variable is the sum
of the upfront investment price (pINVj;t ) and the discounted future ow benets from GCC
subsidies (pGCCj;t ) and electricity cost savings from net metering (p
EL
j;t ):
pj;t = pj;t ()  pINVj;t () 
1   GRGt
1  G| {z }
Gt
pGCCj;t  
1   ERE
1  E| {z }
E
pELj;t (2)
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where G and E are monthly adjusted discount factors, specied as:
G = (1  )(1  ) (3)
E = (1  )(1 + #);
i.e. the monthly discount factor  adjusted for a depreciation parameter , the ination rate
 and the trend in real electricity prices #. We now discuss the three terms in (2) in more
detail.
The rst term in (2), pINVj;t , is the real upfront net investment price of the PV system j
at period t, i.e. the real gross investment price minus tax cuts (taxcutj;t) spread over up to
4 years ( = 1; : : : ; 4):
pINVj;t () = p
GROSS
j;t  
4X
=1
12 taxcutj;t: (4)
Before 2009, there was only a tax cut in the rst year, capped at an indexed maximum
amount. Since 2009 any remaining tax cuts could be shifted to the following three years, so
that the last three terms in the summation in (4) become non-zero.10
The second and third terms in (2) capture the discounted future benets from electricity
production: pGCCj;t and p
EL
j;t are ow variables measuring the monthly benets from the xed
subsidies from the GCCs and the electricity savings associated with the PV system. Both
pGCCj;t and p
EL
j;t are essentially prices per kW at period t (p
GCC
t and p
EL
t ), multiplied by the
capacity size kj of the alternative j (in kW) and a factor that translates PV capacity in
monthly electricity production (0:85
12
MWh=kW ).11 The parameters Gt and 
E are capital-
ization factors that convert the monthly benets for RGt months of GCCs and R
E months of
electricity savings into present value terms using the adjusted monthly discount factors G
and E. According to (3), these are the monthly discount factor  net of any depreciation.
The parameter  captures physical deterioration of electricity production, whereas  is the
monthly ination rate (because GCCs are xed in nominal prices, while our model is in real
prices) and # captures a trend in real electricity prices. As we make several assumptions in
constructing the price variable, we provide a detailed sensitivity analysis in section 4.2.12
Conditional value of not adopting (vi;0;t)
10This possibility only applied to houses older than 5 years. Furthermore, a reduced VAT from 21% to 6%
applied to houses older than 5 years. We account for this by taking a weighted average of the VAT rate and
tax cuts over new and old houses (where 91% is the fraction of old houses).
11We follow CREG, VEA and 3E (2010).
12In our main specication we assume a yearly physical deterioration rate of 1%,  = 1:011=12 1 (following
Audenaert et al., 2010), a yearly ination of 2%,  = 1:021=12 1, and estimate a yearly growth in electricity
prices of 3.4%, # = 0:0028148. We assume RE = 240 months (the expected life time of a PV, following
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The conditional value of not adopting is the ow utility in period t, u0;t, plus the option
value of waiting. More precisely,
vi;0;t = 0;t = u0;t + EtV t+1 (5)
where V t+1 is the ex ante value function, i.e. the continuation value from behaving optimally
from period t+1 onwards, before the random taste shocks are revealed. With a type I extreme
value distribution for the random taste shocks "i;j;t; the ex ante value function V t+1 has the
well-known closed-form logsum expression:
V t+1 = 0:577 + ln
JX
j=0
exp (j;t+1) (6)
where 0:577 is Eulers constant (the mean of the extreme value distribution).
The expectation operator before V t+1 in (5) integrates over uncertainty about the next
period mean utilities t+1 = (0;t+1; 1;t+1; :::; J;t+1). Following Scott (2013), we decompose
EtV t+1 in the realized ex ante value function V t+1 and a short run prediction error t 
V t+1   EtV t+1, We assume that householdsexpectations are on average correct, such that
t is mean zero. We can then write (5) as
vi;0;t = 0;t = u0;t + (V t+1   t) (7)
Random utility maximization
With random utility maximization and a type I extreme value distribution for the random
taste shocks "i;j;t, we obtain the following choice probabilities or predicted market shares for
each alternative j = 0; : : : ; J at period t:
Sj;t = sj;t(t)  exp (j;t)PJ
j0=0 exp (j0;t)
(8)
As in Berry (1994), we can equate the predicted market shares sj;t(t) to the observed market
shares Sj;t because of the inclusion of unobserved qualities j;t for every product and period.
The aggregate market share of alternative j 6= 0 is measured as Sj;t = qj;t=Nt, i.e. the
actual number of adopters of j at t, qj;t, divided by the potential number of adopters at
period t, Nt. Since adoption is a terminal action, the potential number of adopters is the
total number of households N minus the number of households that adopted in the past,
Nt = N 
Pt 1
=1
PJ
j=1 qj; . The aggregate market share of not adopting is S0;t = 1 
PJ
j=1 Sj;t
CREG, 2010), and based on the GCC schemes announced by the government we set RGt = 240 months for
January 2006 - July 2012, RGt = 120 for August 2012 - December 2012, and R
G
t = 180 months for January
2013.
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3.2 Estimating equation
The aggregate market share equation (8) involves two complications. First, the conditional
value for not adopting 0;t involves the future value term V t+1, which is recursively dened
by (6). Second, the unobservable product quality term j;t and prediction error t enter
nonlinearly. We now show how to solve both complications, by combining Hotz and Millers
(1993) conditional choice probability (CCP) approach to deal with dynamic discrete choice
problems, and Berrys (1994) market share inversion to deal with aggregate choice data.
CCP approach
The rst step is to compute the conditional value or mean utility for not adopting, 0;t,
written above as (5) or (7). This contains the ex ante value function V t+1, given by (6),
with the logsum expression that includes future value functions. Hotz and Millers (1993)
insight is to compute the logsum expression directly from the next period conditional choice
probabilities (CCPs). This is particularly convenient when the problem has a terminal action,
as is the case in our set-up for any adoption decision j = 1; : : : ; J .13 We can then take the
next period CCP for any arbitrary terminating choice, so we take j = 1. Parallel to (8), the
conditional choice probability of alternative j = 1 in the next period t+ 1 is given by
S1;t+1 = s1;t+1(t+1)  exp (1;t+1)PJ
j=0 exp (j;t+1)
After rewriting and taking logs, we obtain:
ln
XJ
j=0
exp (j;t+1) = 1;t+1   ln s1;t+1(t+1):
This can be substituted in (6) to obtain the following expression for the ex ante value function
at t+ 1:
V t+1 = 0:577 + 1;t+1   ln s1;t+1(t+1): (9)
As discussed in Arcidiacono and Ellickson (2011), expression (9) has an intuitive interpre-
tation. The ex ante value function (at t + 1) is essentially equal to the utility of choosing
option j = 1 plus the mean of the Type I extreme value distribution (0.577) plus the CCP
correction term   ln s1;t+1(t+1)  0. The CCP correction term adjusts for the fact that
j = 1 may not be optimal, so that the expected utility is on average higher than that of
adopting j = 1 (unless s1;t+1(t+1) = 1).
13This is a particular example of a simplication that occurs because of nite dependence (Arcidiacono &
Miller 2011). An alternative action that qualies for nite dependence is the renewal action. Scott (2013)
explains how to estimate a model with aggregate data if a renewal action is available.
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We can now substitute (9) in the mean utility from not adopting (7) to obtain:
0;t = u0;t +  (0:577 + 1;t+1   ln s1;t+1(t+1)  t)
=  (1;t+1   lnS1;t+1   t) (10)
where the second equality follows from normalizing u0;t + 0:577 = 0 and from the fact
that the CCP at the realized mean utilities is equal to the observed market share (S1;t+1 =
s1;t+1(t+1)). The benet of this approach is that we do not need to make assumptions
on how households expect the mean utilities to evolve, and we do not need any rst stage
predictions of future mean utilities or the CCP before estimation. We simply observe the
variables in 1;t+1 and the next period market share S1;t+1 in the data.
Market share inversion
The second step follows Berrys (1994) approach to estimate static choice models with ag-
gregate market share data. Using the market share expressions (8), we can divide Sj;t for
each j = 1; : : : ; J by S0;t and take logs to obtain
lnSj;t=S0;t = j;t   0;t, j = 1; : : : ; J (11)
Substitute the expressions for the mean utilities (1) and (10) in (11), and rewrite to obtain
the following main estimating equation:
lnSj;t=S0;t = (xj;t   x1;t+1)     (pj;t   p1;t+1) +  lnS1;t+1 + ej;t (12)
where
ej;t  j;t   (1;t+1   t) (13)
is the econometric error term. In the static case where  = 0, this is Berrys standard
aggregate logit regression for the number of new adopters on current prices and other control
variables. To gain further intuition when  > 0, assume there is only one adoption alternative
j = 1. The estimating equation can then be written as:
ln
S1;t=S

0;t+1
S0;t
= (x1;t   x1;t+1)    (p1;t   p1;t+1) + e1;t
With  close to 1, this is essentially a regression for the change in the number of new adopters
on the change in price and possibly other characteristics. Intuitively, with forward-looking
consumers one may expect that the number of current period adopters is small relative to
the next period adopters when the next period price drop is large.
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3.3 Estimation and identication
The estimating equation (12) contains the price variable pj;t, which is given by (2). This
depends on the upfront investment price pINVj;t , the future nancial benets from GCCs
pGCCj;t and electricity savings p
EL
j;t , and it is a non-linear function of the discount factor .
To x ideas, rst consider the case in which  is known and all variables are exogenous,
i.e. uncorrelated with the error term ej;t. In this case, it is possible to estimate (12) using
a simple linear OLS regression for the di¤erenced adoption variable lnSj;t=S0;t    lnS1;t+1
on the di¤erenced product characteristics xj;t   x1;t+1 and the di¤erenced price variable
pj;t   p1;t+1.
Now consider the more general case where  has to be estimated and some of the variables
may be correlated with the error term ej;t. Notice rst that the estimating equation (12)
is non-linear in  because of the way it enters the price term (2), so a non-linear estimator
is necessary. More importantly, several variables in equation (12) give rise to endogeneity
concerns. Recall that, according to (13), the error term ej;t consists of the households
prediction error t and the demand shocks j;t and 1;t+1. As discussed in Scott (2013),
the prediction error t is by construction uncorrelated with any variables known by the
households at time t, so it does not give rise to endogeneity concerns. In contrast, the
demand shocks give rise to endogeneity issues that are similar to those in static discrete
choice demand models. First, pj;t contains the investment price variable pINVj;t , which may be
correlated with the error term if rms charge higher prices when demand is high. Second,
pj;t also contains the electricity price variable pELj;t . This may also be correlated with the error
term to the extent that the GCC subsidies were nanced through higher electricity prices.
Third, the next period adoption rate lnS1;t+1 may be correlated with the error term, since
it contains the next period demand shock 1;t+1.
To account for these problems we construct an instrument vector zj;t that is uncorre-
lated with the error term, and estimate the model using GMM with the following moment
conditions:
E (zj;tej;t) = 0
We include the following variables in our instrument vector zj;t. First, we include a price
index of Chinese PV modules on the European market, pMODj;t . Since these modules are the
most important cost component of PV installations, the price index pMODj;t is expected to
be correlated with the endogenous upfront investment price variable pINVj;t , and as a cost
shifter it is reasonable to assume it does not directly inuence demand. The price index
of Chinese PV modules thus provides a strong and valid instrument to identify the price
coe¢ cient . Second, we include the contractually xed future benets from the GCC
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subsidies pGCCj;t as an instrument. As discussed in section 2, this variable refers to the main
source of future benets from adopting a PV. There is considerable variation in pGCCj;t across
alternatives and over time, even in the short run as the benets showed discontinuous drops in
several months. The variable pGCCj;t thus provides a strong instrument to identify the discount
factor , i.e. how households trade o¤ upfront investment costs with future benets. After
also adding the exogenous xj;t to the set of instruments, the model is identied. However,
to improve e¢ ciency, in a second stage we use an approximation to optimal instruments
(Chamberlain 1987), as applied in static aggregate discrete choice models by Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1999) and Reynaert & Verboven (2014). We explain this in Appendix A.2.
The dynamic discrete choice literature has stressed that the discount factor is not identi-
ed without additional restrictions; see (Manski 1993), Rust (1994) and (Magnac & Thesmar
2002). In our setting we obtain identication by assuming the discount factor that weighs
the upfront investment cost with future benets (i.e. the discount factor that enters pj;t
through (2)) is the same as the discount factor for the timing decision to adopt (i.e. the
discount factor that directly enters (12)). This then gives rise to traditional instruments
coming from variation in the determinants of the upfront investment costs and future ow
benets. As such, our identication approach for estimating the discount factor is the same
as in staticmodels of intertemporal choice, which abstract from the timing decision and
only focus on the investment decision. For example, a detailed literature on the car market
focuses on how households trade o¤ future fuel cost savings against higher upfront purchase
prices, without explicitly modeling the timing of the purchase decision; see Verboven (2002),
Allcott and Wozny (2013) and Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2013)). Lee (2013) uses a
related identication approach in an application on the timing of hardware purchases (video
game consoles) when there are future benets from new software (games). He makes use of
variation in the time until new games arrive, and assumes the discount factor for the timing
of adoption is the same as that for the valuation of investment costs versus future benets.14
3.4 Accounting for local market heterogeneity
The previous subsections provided a framework to study the adoption of PV systems at the
aggregate country level. In this subsection we show how to extend the empirical analysis to
account for rich observed heterogeneity acrossM = 9182 local markets, where each marketm
consists on average of 295 households. We match information on the number of adopters in
14Related approaches to identify the discount factor in dynamic choice problems have relied on exclusion
restrictions (Magnac & Thesmar 2002), stated choice data (Dube et al. 2012), unexpected shocks in expec-
tations about future states (Bollinger 2015) or choices in both static and dynamic contexts (Yao et al. 2012).
17
each market m for each alternative j in each period t to several demographic characteristics.
This enables us to include a rich set of demographics to interact with the price and capacity
size in the utility specication. We also include local market xed e¤ects to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. Alternative approaches to account for unobserved heterogeneity
would be to estimate random coe¢ cients, similar to Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012), or
a nite mixture of unobserved types in the population as in Scott (2013), based on the EM
algorithm of Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). While random coe¢ cients give more exibility,
they do not make e¢ cient use of the local market heterogeneity we observe, and it would no
longer be feasible to use the CCP methodology. A mixture of unobserved types would be
di¢ cult to identify in our context, since households do not make repeat purchases so that
we cannot infer their types from correlations in their decisions over time.
The basic set-up is as before, except that we now observe adoption decisions at the local
market level m and we can match this with an H  1 vector of household demographics
Dm. In each period t a household i living in market m chooses its preferred alternative
j = 0; 1; : : : ; J , where j = 0 is the option not to adopt (yet).
The conditional value of adoption vi;j;t (j = 1; : : : ; J) is the sum of the mean utility j;t
and an individual-specic component m;j;t, which depends on demographics in the local
market m. We specify:
vi;j;t = j;t + m;j;t
= j;t + wj;tm; (14)
where j;t was given earlier by (1), and wj;t is a 1  K vector of characteristics of the PV
alternatives (which is allowed to di¤er from xj;t entering j;t). We specify the K  1 vector
m = Dm, where  is a K H parameter matrix with interaction e¤ects to be estimated.
The vector of characteristics wj;t will include a constant, the additional capacity relative to a
reference capacity (we take j = 1, which is the 4kW alternative), and the price variable. The
vector of household demographicsDm includes dummy variables for each local marketm, but
also income, household size, house size, etc. We will not estimate all the interaction e¤ects
in , so we constrain some of these coe¢ cients to be zero. We interact the constant with
the local market dummy variables, and price and capacity with a selection of the household
demographics.
The conditional value of not adopting vi;0;t is
vi;0;t = um;0;t + EtV m;t+1:
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where the ex ante value function is now specic to market m and given by
V m;t+1 = 0:577 + ln
JX
j=0
exp(vi;j;t+1)
Finally, the logit choice probabilities in market m are
sm;j;t =
exp(vi;j;t)PJ
j0=0 exp(vi;j0;t)
: (15)
As in our aggregate adoption model, one could in principle consider to set the choice prob-
abilities equal to the observed local market shares Sm;j;t = qm;j;t=Nm;t by introducing local
market unobservables for each m; j; t.15 We could then take similar steps as for the country-
level aggregate model to obtain a regression equation at the local market, parallel to (12).
In practice, however, this regression approach is not possible because we observe many zero
market shares at the disaggregate local level (qm;j;t = 0), so that the logarithmic expres-
sions in both the Hotz-Miller and Berry inversions are not dened. We therefore take an
alternative approach, which in short amounts to combining the moment conditions from
the aggregate model with a set of micro-moments that consist of the score vector from the
likelihood function of the model. We outline the details of this procedure in Appendix A.3.
4 Empirical results
We rst discuss our main ndings with a focus on the estimated discount factor (subsection
4.1). To interpret these ndings more thoroughly, we then perform a detailed sensitivity
analysis with respect to alternative assumptions about how future payo¤s enter utility (sub-
section 4.2). Finally, we use the parameter estimates to consider the budgetary impact of
an alternative policy to promote PV adoption with upfront investment instead of future
production subsidies (subsection 4.3).
4.1 Main ndings
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the included variables and instruments for the sample
on which we estimate the model (May 2009 December 2012).
The rst panel shows summary statistics for the number of adopters. At the aggregate
country level, we observe the number of adopters for 5 levels of capacity during 44 months,
15This extends the notation of the aggregate adoption model: qm;j;t is the actual number of adopters
in market m of alternative j at period t, and Nm;t is the potential number of adopters, Nm;t = Nm  Pt 1
=1
PJ
j=1 qm;j; (with Nm is the total number of households).
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resulting in 220 observations. At the disaggregate level, we observe the number of adopters
for 9182 local markets, resulting in more than 2 million observations. The average number
of adopters per capacity level is 894 at the country level, and it has always been positive
for every capacity and month. At the local market level, the average number of monthly
adopters is evidently much smaller at 0:10. Because of the highly disaggregate level, the
number of adoptions is zero for many local markets. The median number of adopters for a
capacity level/month/local market is actually zero.
The second panel presents information on the components of the price variable. This
shows for example that the investment price of a PV has on average been 20,700e, with a
large standard deviation both because of falling prices over time and large di¤erences depend-
ing on the capacity size. The third panel shows the excluded instruments, i.e. the variables
that do not enter the model directly but are correlated with the endogenous investment cost
and electricity price.
The fourth panel shows information on the household characteristics for the cross-section
of 9,182 local markets. This shows for example that the household size is on average 2:47,
but varies between 1 and 6. Similarly, median yearly income is on average 24; 000 EUR, and
varies between 4; 800 and 51; 800 across the statistical sectors.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Notation Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Obs.
Adoptions
Country level qj;t 894.18 1297.30 4 311 7164 220
Local market level qm;j;t 0.10 0.41 0 0 26 2,020,040
Price variable (in 103 EUR)
Investment cost pGROSSj;t 20.70 10.85 48.20 19.61 50.82 220
Monthly GCC subsidies pGCCj;t 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.35 220
Monthly electricity bill savings pELj;t 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.17 220
Tax cut year 1 taxcut1j;t 2.63 1.62 0 3.69 3.69 220
Tax cut year 2 taxcut2j;t 1.83 1.57 0 2.44 3.36 220
Tax cut year 3 taxcut3j;t 1.20 1.50 0 0 3.36 220
Tax cut year 4 taxcut4j;t 0.55 1.11 0 0 3.36 220
Excluded instruments
Module price (103 EUR) pMODj;t 7.81 5.01 10.60 6.56 2.33 220
Oil price (EUR / barrel) pOILt 68.37 12.10 40.69 71.20 88.37 44
Local market variables (Nm and Dm)
Households Nm 295.26 320.88 1 191 3608 9,182
Pop. density (104 inhab / m2) 0.16 0.24 0.00 0.09 2.89 9,182
Average house size 5.93 0.64 1.85 5.96 9 9,182
Average household size 2.47 0.34 1 2.49 6 9,182
Average house age (decades) 5.19 1.49 0.37 5.07 11.3 9,182
Median income (104 EUR) 2.40 0.36 0.48 2.40 5.18 9,182
% home owners 0.77 0.17 0 0.82 1 9,182
% higher education 0.26 0.11 0 0.25 1 9,182
% foreign 0.06 0.09 0 0.03 1 9,182
Notes: The total number of observations is 2,020,040 = 44 time periods x 5 capacity choices x 9,182
local markets. All prices are corrected for ination using the HICP and set to prices of January 2013.
Half-yearly electricity prices extrapolated using cubic spline interpolation, missing values on local market
level replaced replaced by averages within the 308 municipalities (642 markets for median income and
between 0 and 146 markets for other variables).
Table 2 shows the empirical results. We begin with a discussion of specication (1) and (2),
which are estimated with country-level data and do not account for household heterogeneity.
Both specications include xed e¤ects for each capacity size using the most popular 4kW
system as the base. We used the same system as the choice of a terminal action j = 1 in
(10). Specication (2) in addition includes several time variables: seasonal dummies and a
trend.
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The investment price coe¢ cient is negative and statistically signicant, meaning that
consumers responded positively to the decline in investment prices of PV systems. The
magnitude of the investment price coe¢ cient is comparable for both specications ( 0:470
and  0:439). The estimated (real) discount factor measures the valuation of the future ben-
ets relative to the investment price. The monthly discount factor is very similar for both
specications (0:9884 and 0:9895), and di¤ers signicantly from 1. It is more informative
to convert the monthly discount factor into an annual implicit interest rate. The results
show that the real implicit interest rate is 15:09% in the rst specication (standard error of
3:43%), and a similar 13:52% in the second specication (standard error of 2:17%). These
estimates are much higher than the interest rate on risk-free or moderate risk investments,
such as savings accounts or checking accounts. Imperfect capital markets and high market
interest rates may in principle be responsible for this, but this is not plausible in this market
because between 2009 and 2011 the federal government subsidized loans for environmentally
friendly investments.16 This then suggests there is much more consumer myopia in invest-
ment decisions for new technologies such as PV installations than has been observed in recent
work on mature technologies such as the car industry. This high interest rate implies that
consumers are only willing to pay 0:5 euro upfront for one euro of total discounted future
benets from electricity production.17 Put di¤erently, if consumers would have been more
forward looking, the generous GCC subsidy policy would have led to an even faster adoption
of PV systems. In the next subsection, we will investigate the sources of the high interest
rates, by looking at the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to alternative assumptions.
Before turning to this, we discuss the results of specication (3), which is estimated with
local market data and accounts for household heterogeneity. The investment price coe¢ cient
increases somewhat (from  0:439 to  0:523), which can be explained by the inclusion of an
interaction variable for median income with price. This interaction e¤ect shows that high
income households tend to be less price sensitive, so that for the average income the price
coe¢ cient is close to the estimate from the aggregate model.
Most importantly, the estimated discount factor remains almost identical when we ac-
count for household heterogeneity. The implied annual implicit interest rate is 13:00% (com-
pared with 13:52% in the model without heterogeneity). So also in the richer model there is
evidence of consumer myopia in adopting the new PV technology.
Finally, the coe¢ cients for the household characteristics interacted with the capacity of a
16Source: http://minn.fgov.be/portail2/nl/themes/dwelling/energysaving/green.htm
17One (real) euro of production benets is valued at A() = 1 ((1 ))
RE
1 (1 ) . We obtain the cited number as
the ratio of the benets at the estimated household discount factor over the benets at the market discount
factor, i.e. A(0:9895)=A(0:9975) = 0:5, where 0:9975 = 1:03 1=12 at the market interest rate of 3%.
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PV usually have an intuitive interpretation. As expected, large households, households living
in large houses or in areas with a low population density especially value a large capacity.
High income households, highly educated people and home owners tend to adopt smaller
PVs. Foreigners and households living in older houses tend to invest in larger PVs.18
18In De Groote et al. (2016), we estimate descriptive models with a more elaborate set of demographic
variables.
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Table 2: Empirical results
(1) (2) (3)
Dynamic + time controls + micro-moments
Price sensitivity in 103 EUR ( ) -0.470*** (0.098) -0.439*** (0.117) -0.523*** (0.121)
Monthly discount factor () 0.9884*** (0.0025) 0.9895*** (0.0016) 0.9899*** (0.0015)
Annual interest rate (r   12   1) 15.09%*** (3.43%) 13.52%*** (2.17%) 13.00%*** (2.05%)
Control variables ()
Alternative-specic constant
Common constant -1.423 (16.38) -611.4 (1017.9) -774.8 (1130.7)
2kW -1.828*** (0.562) -1.613*** (0.421) -0.927* (0.508)
6kW -0.513 (0.595) -0.722 (0.461) -1.507*** (0.543)
8kW -2.453** (1.158) -2.882*** (0.881) -4.504*** (1.047)
10kW -2.605 (1.684) -3.253*** (1.261) -5.753*** (1.518)
Time controls
Linear time trend 1.175 (1.986) 1.504 (2.226)
Spring -0.177 (0.470) -0.170 (0.472)
Summer -0.047 (0.493) -0.029 (0.497)
Fall -0.021 (0.358) -0.011 (0.362)
Local market variables ()
Interactions with constant Local market xed
e¤ects included
Interactions with capacity di¤erence
Pop. density (104 inhab / m2) -0.690*** (0.029)
Average house size 0.057*** (0.009)
Average household size 0.125*** (0.016)
Average house age (decades) 0.011*** (0.002)
Median income (104 EUR) -0.065*** (0.021)
% home owners -0.075** (0.038)
% higher education -0.129*** (0.041)
% foreign 0.383*** (0.040)
Interaction with price
Median income (104 EUR) 0.032*** (0.006)
Obs. macro moments (JxT) 220 220 220
Obs. micro moments (MxJxT) 0 0 935,440
Notes: Macro moments clustered within 44 time periods, micro moment clustered within sample of 4252 local
markets. Instruments are approximations of optimal instruments (Chamberlain, 1987). Standard errors of r,
common constant and linear time trend obtained via delta method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Before turning to the implications for the governments GCC policy, we consider several
possible explanations for the high estimate of the real implicit interest rate. We look into
this by assessing the impact of the various assumptions we made in section 3.1 when con-
structing the up-front investment price and the future benets. As such, this also serves as
a sensitivity analysis of our main results. We use the aggregate adoption model, because the
estimates of the implicit interest rate were very close to the disaggregate model with house-
hold heterogeneity and because it is computationally much faster so that a very detailed
sensitivity analysis becomes possible.
We distinguish between three possible explanations for the high implicit interest rate: the
durability of the PV technology, consumer expectations about the governments commitment,
and intrinsic consumer myopia.
Durability of the PV technology A rst explanation for the high implicit interest rate
is that the durability of the PV technology is lower than assumed in our main specication,
so that the future benets are in practice lower. Figure 7 shows how the estimated implicit
interest rate varies as we change the assumptions on the durability of the PV technology:
the life expectancy R and the yearly deterioration rate . The vertical lines denote the
assumptions made in the base model.
Figure 7 shows that the estimated implicit interest rate remains robust if we increase
the life expectancy R above the assumed value of 20 years or if we reduce it by several
years. We only estimate a low, market-oriented implicit interest rate under unrealistically
low values for the life expectancy, say 10 years or shorter. The estimated implicit interest
rate decreases as we assume a higher value for the deterioration rate  in the production of
electricity. However, even an unrealistically high deterioration rate of 5% annually does not
bring market interest rate within the condence interval of our estimates. We conclude that
the estimated implicit interest rate would only become close to market interest rates under
unrealistic assumptions regarding the durability of the PV technology.
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Figure 7: Estimate of annual real interest rate under di¤erent investment assumptions
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Consumer expectations about governments commitment A second explanation
for the high implicit interest rate is that consumers may fear that the government will not
fulll its subsidy policy. The government had guaranteed the net metering principle for the
life time of a PV (assumed to be 20 years), and had similarly guaranteed the payment of
the GCC subsidies for a xed number of years (10 to 20 years, depending on the date of
installation). Figure 8 shows how the estimated implicit interest rate varies as consumers
expect a di¤erent duration for net metering benets or GCC subsidies, i.e. when we either
change the value of RE or RGt in (2).
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Changes in expectations about net metering does not a¤ect the estimated implicit interest
rate. This is interesting, because the government has in practice introduced a fee for using net
metering, but any anticipation of this by consumers cannot explain the high implicit interest
19A breach in both contracts is equivalent to the change in the lifetime of a PV, which we considered
earlier in Figure 7.
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Figure 8: Estimate of annual real interest rate under di¤erent bliefs in goverments commit-
ments
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rate. In contrast, a change in expectations about GCC subsidies does have an impact on
the results. If consumers fear that the government will remove the 20 year subsidy program
already after 5 years, the estimated interest rate comes close to market rates. Hence, one
could rationalize consumer behavior if they expect that the government will breach the
contract by removing the subsidies after a short period. We note however that such a breach
in contract has not actually occurred.
These gures also highlight how identication of the discount factor in our model mainly
comes from changes in GCC subsidies, rather than changes in net metering benets. This
can be explained by the larger variation in the GCC price than in the electricity price. We
also experimented with di¤erent assumptions on the evolution of electricity prices and found
that this does not a¤ect the results.
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Consumer myopia A remaining explanation for the high implicit interest rate would be
that this is evidence for consumer myopia. It is then still interesting to ask where such myopia
might come from. A rst possibility is that consumers only take into account the future
subsidies but fail to take into account the tax cuts. Another possibility is that consumers
only correctly value the benets up to the pay-back period, and undervalue the benets
after that. The pay-back period is that time when all collected benets are equal to the
investment costs. This number is often quoted in advertising or media coverage, so it may
be an important source of information for households who cannot do a net present value
calculation. Figure 9 shows how the estimated implicit interest rate varies if consumers do
not correctly account for the tax cuts or for the benets after the pay-back period.
Figure 9: Estimate of annual real interest rate under consumer myopia
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To assess the role of an incorrect valuation of the tax cuts, we multiply the tax cut benets
by a parameter between 0 and 100%. The estimated implicit interest rate remains high even
for quite severe undervaluation of the tax cuts. Hence, a failure to take into account the tax
cuts may partly explain household myopia, but the high interest rate appears to be mainly
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due to undervaluation of the GCC benets.
To assess the role of the payback period, we multiply the benets after the payback period
by another parameter between 0 and 100%. The estimated implicit interest rate becomes
close to the market interest rate for strong undervaluation after the payback period (at about
40% or lower of the actual benets).
In sum, our nding of a high implicit interest rate remains robust after using more con-
servative assumptions regarding the durability of the PV technology. Potential explanations
for the high implicit interest rate are consumer distrust in the governments commitment to
provide the GCC subsidies for up to 20 years, or intrinsic consumer myopia, for example
stemming from a failure to take into account benets after the payback period.
4.3 Policy implication
Our nding that consumers use a real implicit interest rate of 13% when deciding to adopt
a PV system has an important policy implication. One may ask the question whether the
government could not have achieved the same level of adoption by removing the future
GCC subsidy program and instead paying an equivalent upfront subsidy, and borrowing the
required amount on the capital market at the long run government bond real interest rate
of 3%. More precisely, according to the utility specication (2) and (3), a household who
adopts a PV system j at time t perceives a net present value from the GCC subsidy during
RGt months of
NPVj;t =
1  ((1  )(1  ))RGt
1  (1  )(1  ) p
GCC
j;t ;
where the estimated monthly discount factor  = 0:9899 corresponds to an implicit annual
interest rate of r =  12   1 = 13:00%. The government could thus have paid out the
amount NPVj;t as an upfront subsidy program and obtained the same adoption rate. If the
government instead spreads the subsidies over the next RGt months, the net present value at
the government bond interest rate rgov = 
 12
gov   1 = 3% amounts to
NPV ACTUALj;t =
1   (1  )(1  )govRGt
1  (1  )(1  )gov
pGCCj;t :
Hence, the government could have reached an identical number of adopters with an upfront
subsidy NPVj;t and saved the amount NPV ACTUALj;t   NPVj;t for a household that adopts
PV system j at time t. Summing this over all adopters and all PV systems, we nd that
the cost of the actual subsidy program was e 3:79 billion in net present value terms, while
the cost of an upfront subsidy program would have been only e 2:06 billion (actualized to
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2013). Hence, the government could have achieved the same adoption rates at only 54% of
the current subsidy costs, amounting to a saving of e 1:74 billion (with a 90% condence
interval of [e 1:44e 1:97] billion20). This is a saving of almost e 700 per Flemish household,
which is a very large number given that only 8.3% of the households had adopted a PV by
December 2012. Savings would have been even higher if the government would also have
abandoned the net metering principle (future benets through electricity cost savings pELj;t )
in favour of an even larger upfront subsidy, or if the government would also have followed
an upfront subsidy policy for commercial users (capacity size higher than 10kW).
5 Conclusion
This paper studied the incentives to adopt a new renewable energy technology for electricity
production, and the role played by upfront investment and future production subsidies. We
considered a generous subsidy program for solar PV adoption, and exploited rich variation at
pre-announced dates in the future subsidy conditions. Although the program led to a massive
adoption of solar PV systems, we nd that households signicantly undervalued the future
benets from the new technology, which has important budgetary and distributional impli-
cations. The government could have saved 46% or e 1:7 billion by giving upfront investment
subsidies, and it essentially shifted the subsidy burden to future electricity consumers.
We contribute to the literature on how consumers discount future energy costs. We show
that consumers are apparently considerably more myopic in the adoption decision of an
entirely new green technology, than in the energy-saving investment decision of existing
technologies.
We adopted a tractable dynamic model of technology adoption, and several directions
of future work are possible. First, with our data it may be possible to further exploit the
local market data and estimate the distribution of the discount factor conditional on socio-
demographic characteristics. This would make it possible to further understand the distribu-
tional e¤ects of the subsidization policy. Another path of research is to extend the model to
account for peer e¤ects, which may provide a rationale for a subsidy path that is declining
over time.
Third, it would be interesting to use our framework to study the adoption of new tech-
nologies in other applications. Regarding renewables, we focused on residential PV adoption,
and further work could investigate whether investment myopia also applies to commercial
20To calculate the condence interval, we take 1000 draws of  which, as a GMM estimate, is normally
distributed with mean of 0:9899 and standard error of 0:0015. We calculate the government loss for each
draw of  to obtain a distribution of this loss.
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PV adopters. It would also be interesting to apply our framework to other countries or re-
gions, or other renewable technologies, such as wind power, to analyze how di¤erent subsidy
schemes may inuence the outcomes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data construction
As discussed in the text, the main dataset contains information of all installed PVs across
Flanders during 20062012. We combine this dataset with various additional datasets on
prices, investment tax benets, electricity prices, GCCs and socio-demographic data at the
local market level.
A.1.1 PV installations
The main dataset comes from VREG, the Flemish regulator of the electricity and gas market.
The data records the following three key variables for every new PV installation: the adoption
date, the size of the installation and the address of the installation. We aggregate the data to
the monthly level, distinguishing between ve categories of capacity sizes: 2kW, 4kW, 6kW,
8kW and 10kW. Each category includes all capacity sizes up to the indicated maximum.
For example, a capacity size of 6kW refers to all capacity sizes between 4kW and 6kW.
To focus on residential solar panels, we exclude all installations with a capacity size larger
than 10kW. This is a commonly used cut-o¤ point for distinguishing between residential and
non-residential PVs (see e.g. Kwan (2012)). Furthermore, systems of more than 10kW do
not qualify from the same public support measures in Flanders.
Our main model aggregates the number of installations to the level of the entire region
of Flanders. The extended model considers the highly disaggregate level of the statistical
sector, as dened by ADSEI, the Belgian statistical o¢ ce. The region has 9,182 statistical
sectors, with on average 295 households. To organize the data at the level of the statistical
sector, we use of a geographic dataset from ADSEI that assigns street addresses of each
installation to statistical sectors.
A.1.2 Gross investment price
We obtained price information of PV systems from two independent sources: an internet fo-
rum, zonstraal.be, where consumers posted their quotes; and a website, comparemysolar.be,
which contains historical data. This resulted in a dataset of 2,659 o¤ers from May 2009
until December 2012. To construct a monthly price index for each of the ve capacity size
categories (between 2kW and 10kW), we proceeded as follows. For each month and each
size category we take the median price per watt, multiplied by the size of the category. If
there are less than ten price observations in a given month and category (usually the less
popular 8kW and 10kW PVs), we consider the median to be insu¢ ciently accurate. As a
1
price measure for these cases, we use the prediction from a quantile regression model for the
median price per watt on monthly xed e¤ects, capacity xed e¤ects and capacity interacted
with a linear time trend.
To combine the price information with the data on PV installations per month and per
size category, we assume there was a time lag of two months between the posted prices and
the actual installment. In some months, especially when subsidies would drop in the near
future, consumers reported the expected waiting time together with the posted price o¤er.
If such information on the announced waiting time was available, we use this instead of the
assumption of a two month time lag.
A.1.3 Public support measures
We obtained information of public support measures from various sources.
Investment tax credits Tax credits fall under the competence of the Belgian Federal
government. Information on a doubling of the tax credit ceilings comes from the o¢ cial
document Programmawetof 28 December 2006, and announcements on the website of the
government agency VEA before and after this publication.21 Information on spreading tax
cuts or splitting bills over multiple years comes from newspaper articles22 and the Economic
Recovery Plan of the Federal Government (March 2009). Details about the abolishment
of the tax cut were found on the o¢ cial website of the nance department of the federal
government.23 Information on the VAT rules also can be found on this website.24
We combine this information with the price data to compute the net investment price,
as described more formally in section 3.1.
Net metering and Green Current Certicates (GCCs) Information on retail
electricity prices comes from Eurostat. These data are half-yearly, and we transform it to
monthly data using cubic spline interpolation. We multiply the electricity prices with the
expected electricity production to compute the expected electricity cost savings from net
metering, as described more formally in section 3.1.
21Announcements on the doubling of the tax credit ceiling on 6 and 16 December 2006 and information on
the increase from 2000 to 2600e between 1 and 21 March 2007 on VEAs website energiesparen.be. Historic
copies from this website are on Internet Archive (https://web.archive.org).
22Gazet Van Antwerpen: Zonnepanelen zijn tot drie keer scaal aftrekbaar, 19 Mei 2008; Het Nieuws-
blad: Belastingvoordeel klanten nekt installateurs zonnepanelen, 13 December 2008
23http://www.minn.fgov.be/portail2/nl/current/spokesperson-11-11-30.htm, consulted 14 May 2014.
24http://minn.fgov.be/portail2/nl/themes/dwelling/renovation/vat.htm, consulted 14 May 2014.
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Information on the background and start of the GCC policy relating to PVs in 2006 comes
from the website of the Flemish energy regulator VREG (www.vreg.be) and from o¢ cial
documents and government information brochures.25 The price of a GCC was guaranteed
for a xed period, but it was initially expected that GCCs could continue to be sold at
the (much lower) market price for the entire life time of the PV system. The renewal of
the energy decree in 2012 (Flemish Energy Decree, 30 July 2012) no longer allowed for the
possibility to obtain GCCs after the expiration of the xed period with the guaranteed price.
In practice, this does not change much because the life expectancy of PV systems (about 20
years) is close to the xed period with the guaranteed price.
Information on the nancial details of the GCC policy comes from the Belgian energy
regulator CREG (2010). Announcements of new subsidy policies were gathered from newspa-
pers. The rst change in policy was announced in February 2009 (De Standaard, 7 February
2009, p2) for PVs installed from 2010 on. The second change was announced in June 2011
(De Standaard, 6 June 2011, Economie p12) for PVs from July 2011 on. The third change
was announced in May 2012 (De Standaard, 26 May 2012) for PVs installed from August
2012 on and the nal change was in July 2012 (Degree proposal amending the Energy Decree
of 8 May 2009 (6 July 2012) and Energy decree 8 May 2009, changed 30 July 2012) for PVs
installed from 2013 on.
Based on the information from these sources, Table A1 provides an overview of the policy
support measures during the period 20062012 (and the rst months of 2013). Figure 1 in
the text makes use of this information to express the various subsidies in present value terms.
25See the Flemish Energy Decree, changed on 6 July 2012, KB 10 February 1983, changed by the Flemish
government on 15 July 2005, 16 June 1998: Besluit van de Vlaamse Regering tot wijziging van het koninklijk
besluit van 10 februari 1983 houdende aanmoedigingsmaatregelen voor het rationeel energieverbruik.The
latter also included information about the investment subsidies of which more information was found in a
government brochure Subsidieregeling voor elektriciteit uit zonlicht(2005).
3
Table A1: PV support policy Flanders: 2006-2013/06
Date of investment GCC Subsidy Tax cut on investment
Price Duration Percentage Ceiling
(EUR) (years) (EUR 1988)
2006 450 20 10% 40% 1000
2007 450 20 10% 40% 2600*
2008 450 20 0% 40% 2600
2009 450 20 0% 40% 2600 x 4**
2010 350 20 0% 40% 2600 x 4**
2011/01-2011/06 330 20 0% 40% 2600 x 4**
2011/07-2011/09 300 20 0% 40% 2600 x 4**
2011/10 - 2011/12 270 20 0% 40%*** 2600 x 4***
2012/01 - 2012/03 250 20 0% 0% 0
2012/04 - 2012/06 230 20 0% 0% 0
2012/07 210 20 0% 0% 0
2012/08 - 2012/12 90 10 0% 0% 0
2013/01-2013/06 21.39**** 15 0% 0% 0
*Announced as 2000 but changed to 2600. New announcement made: 18 March 2007.
** If house > 5years old, the tax cut could be spread over 4 years. Announced March 2009.
*** Contract had to be signed before 28 November 2011. Announced on the same date.
**** Corrected for banding factor
A.1.4 Socio-demographic characteristics
For the disaggregate model at the local market level we collected socio-demographic infor-
mation per statistical sector. This data is freely downloadable from the website of ADSEI,
the Belgian Statistics O¢ ce. We used population data for each statistical sector in 2011
to create the following variables: population density, average house size (number of rooms),
average household size, average house age, % of home owners, % with a higher education
degree and % foreign (people who do not have the Belgian nationality). For condentiality
reasons, some variables are not reported when the number of households in the statistical
sector is very small. This applies to a small subset of statistical sectors. In these cases, we
use the average of the municipality to which the statistical sector belongs.
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A.1.5 Exogenous instruments
Two variables we use do not directly inuence the adoption decision of households, but
we use them as instruments for endogenous variable that do a¤ect the decision. The rst
exogenous instrument is the price index for Chinese Crystalline PV modules of "pvxchange"
that is available on their website. The prices are per kW so we multiply them by the kW of
each category to create pMODj;t . In the discussion on optimal instruments, we also added the
oil price as an additional exogenous instrument. The price of crude oil was obtained from
Thomson Reuters Datastream. As with other price variables in the model, we correct for
ination by using the HICP.
A.2 Optimal instruments
We estimate the model using an approximation of Chamberlains (1987) optimal instruments.
While any set of exogenous instruments leads to consistent estimates, more e¢ cient and
stable estimates can be found using approximations to optimal instruments . In this section
we discuss the optimal instruments in the model that only uses macro data, i.e. ignoring
local market heterogeneity. In the next section, which provides details on how we estimate
the model when micro data are added, we discuss how we adapt optimal instruments in this
case.
Dening the parameter vector  = (; ; ), the conditional moment conditions are
E (ej;t()jzj;t) = 0
where
ej;t() = lnSj;t=S0;t   (xj;t   x1;t+1)  +  (pj;t()  p1;t+1())   lnS1;t+1 (16)
The optimal instrument matrix of Chamberlain (1987) for a single-equation GMM estimator
is:
gjt(zjt) = Djt(zjt)
0
 1jt
with 
jt = E[(ej;t)2jzjt]
Djt(zjt) =

E

@ej;t()
@0
 zjt
=

E

@ej;t()
@
 zjt E  @ej;t()@
 zjt E  @ej;t()@0
 zjt
In our approximation, we follow Newey (1990) and set 
jt = 
; i.e. we ignore potential
heteroscedasticity. Moreover, since 
 is a scalar in the single-equation GMM estimator, we
can also replace it by the identity matrix.
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We now derive the optimal instruments for these various parameters. First, for the linear
parameter vector  we simply have:
E

@ej;t()
@0
 zjt =  E [xj;t   x1;t+1jzjt] =   (xj;t   x1;t+1) : (17)
The optimal instrument for  is therefore just a di¤erence term for the exogenous variable
xj;t, where  is substituted by an estimate b in a rst stage using non-optimal instruments.
For the other linear parameter  we have
E

@ej;t()
@
 zjt = E [pj;t()  p1;t+1()jzjt] = E [pj;t()jzjt]  E [p1;t+1()jzjt] : (18)
In this expression the conditional expectation of price is
E [pj;t()jzjt] = E

pINVj;t ()jzjt
  Gt ()E pGCCj;t jzjt  E ()E pELj;t jzjt
= E

pGROSSj;t jzjt
  4X
=1
12E

taxcutj;tjzjt

 Gt () pGCCj;t   E ()E

pELt jzjt

k0j (19)
where the capitalization factors Gt () and 
E () are dened in (2) and depend on the dis-
count factor . pELj;t is the electricity price per MWh, multiplied by k
0
j; the monthly electricity
production of a PV with capacity kj: The optimal instrument for  thus also depends on 
for which we use an estimate b in a rst stage using non-optimal instruments. In contrast
with the optimal instrument for , it is now also necessary to compute several conditional
expectations, namely for the upfront investment cost of a solar panel, the future tax cuts
and the electricity price. The predicted gross investment cost E

pGROSSj;t ()
 zjt is obtained
from a constant elasticity model, using a Poisson regression and logarithmic regressors (see
Silva and Tenreyro (2006)). Based on this predicted value we can also calculate the pre-
dicted future eligible tax cuts E

taxcutj;tjzjt

. The predicted electricity price E

pELt jzjt

is similarly obtained using the oil price as an exogenous regressor. We show the regression
results in Tables A2 and A3. Note that any misspecication of these structural assumptions
only inuences the optimality of our instrument set and not the consistency of the structural
estimates.
Finally, the optimal instrument for the nonlinear parameter  is
E

@ej;t()
@
 zjt = x1;t+1   E [ lnS1;t+1j zjt]
+

E

@pj;t()
@
 zjt  E [p1;t+1()j zjt]  E  @p1;t+1()@
 zjt  :(20)
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In the above expression the expected value of the derivative of price with respect to  is
E

@pj;t()
@
 zjt =   4X
=1
1212 1E

taxcutj;tjzjt

 @
G
t ()
@
pGCCj;t  
@E ()
@
E

pELt jzjt

k0j
where the derivatives with respect to the capitalization factors Gt () and 
E () are easily
computed from (2) and (3). The optimal instrument for  therefore depends on all para-
meters  = (; ; ), for which we obtain a consistent rst stage estimate using non-optimal
instruments. There is also an additional expectation term for the CCP term, i.e. the log
of the predicted next period market share of alternative 1, E [lnS1;t+1jzjt]. We obtain this
from a linear regression on several variables, similar to the prediction of the rst stage of
an IV regression, as shown in Table A4. Note that by using future values of exogenous
instruments, we assume that these variables are not correlated with the demand shock or
prediction error at time t. Therefore, they must be known at time t. Since we are only using
one and two month leads, we believe this is a reasonable assumption as new policies were
announced several months ahead (see section A.1).
To summarize, our nal estimation procedure takes the following steps:
 Estimate a GMM model with instruments pMODj;t ; pGCCj;t and xj;t to obtain an initial
consistent estimate of ;  and 
 Compute the conditional expectations for the investment price, the electricity price
and the CCP term using the regression models
 Estimate the GMM model again, but now using the approximation of optimal instru-
ments, as given by (17), (18) and (20), after substituting (19) and the initial consistent
estimates of ;  and .
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Table A2: Estimation results for electricity price
Variables E

pELt jzjt

Log of oil price 0.1832***
(0.0178)
Constant 4.5992***
(0.0729)
Observations 44
Poisson regression model of exponential conditional mean
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3: Estimation results for predicting PV investment cost
Variables E

pGROSSj;t jzjt

Log of PV module price x kW 0.4986***
(0.0633)
4kW 0.2018***
(0.0213)
6kW 0.3103***
(0.0310)
8kW 0.3999***
(0.0391)
10kW 0.4679***
(0.0454)
log of GCC benets 0.1124*
(0.0582)
Constant 4.6310***
(0.3156)
Observations 220
Poisson regression model of exponential conditional mean
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered within time period
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A4: Estimation results for predicting log of CCP
Variables E [ln s1;t+1jzjt]
PV module price x 4kW in t+1 -0.0017***
(0.0006)
PV module price x 4kW in t+2 0.0017***
(0.0005)
GCC benets of 4kW in t+1 0.1319***
(0.0165)
GCC benets of 4kW in t+2 -0.0318*
(0.0170)
Oil price x 4kW in t+1 -0.0132
(0.0089)
Oil price x 4kW in t+2 0.0010
(0.0082)
Spring dummy in t+1 0.2116
(0.2997)
Summer dummy in t+1 0.0462
(0.3794)
Fall dummy in t+1 0.3824
(0.3378)
t+1 0.2636***
(0.0530)
Spring dummy in t+2 0.1358
(0.3006)
Summer dummy in t+2 0.4557
(0.4016)
Fall dummy in t+2 0.0269
(0.2662)
Constant -175.747***
(32.0246)
Observations 44
OLS regression model of linear conditional mean
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.3 Estimation of model with local market heterogeneity
Section 3.4 specied the model with local market heterogeneity. We estimate this model
using a GMM estimator that combines macro and micro-moments. This is in the spirit of
the static discrete choice literature, as in Petrin (2002) and Berry et al. (2004), and applied
to local market data in Nurski and Verboven (2016).
First, we explain how one could proceed when the discount factor  is known, i.e. does
not need to be estimated. In this case it is possible to estimate the impact of local market
heterogeneity and of the mean utility determinants in two separate steps. Second, we explain
how to proceed if the discount factor  is not known, i.e. needs to be estimated. This also
includes a discussion of how we implement optimal instruments and some nal estimation
details.
A.3.1 Estimation when the discount factor  is known
Step 1. Maximum likelihood estimation including xed e¤ects ej;t
In this step we construct the likelihood function of observing the local market adoption data,
and we maximize this likelihood function with respect to the parameters, including a large
set of alternative/time xed e¤ects ej;t. We rst make use of the Hotz-Miller CCP, sm;1;t+1,
to obtain an expression for vi;0;t that is parallel to that of (10) above26:
vi;0;t =  (vi;1;t+1   ln sm;1;t+1   t) : (21)
Note that this assumes that a households prediction error is common across local markets.
We then use the expressions for the conditional values vi;j;t and vi;0;t, as given by (14) and
(21), to write the choice probabilities (15) as:
sm;j;t =
exp(vi;j;t   vi;0;t)
1 +
PJ
j0=1 exp(vi;j0;t   vi;0;t)
=
exp(ej;t + ewj;tm +  ln sm;1;t+1)
1 +
PJ
j0=1 exp(
ej0;t + ewj0;tm +  ln sm;1;t+1) (22)
where we dene ej;t  j;t  (1;t+1   t) and ewj;t  wj;t  w1;t+1. We can write (22) more
compactly as a function of the parameters to be estimated, sm;j;t
e;, where e is a vector
26In contrast to the model with only aggregate data, we cannot observe the CCP directly due to the small
number of households in each statistical sector. We therefore predict the CCPs in a rst stage, using a
exible logit that includes time and local market xed e¤ects and the interactions between capacity choices
and elements of the price variable.
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with the alternative/time xed e¤ects ej;t and  is the parameter matrix with interaction
e¤ects at the local market level.
The maximization problem of the log likelihood function is then
maxe; lnL(e;) =X
m;j;t
qm;j;t ln sm;j;t(e;);
where qm;j;t is the observed number of adopters in local market m of alternative j at period
t. Note that this contains a potentially large number of parameters, because of the set of
alternative/time xed e¤ects ej;t (J T ), but also a large number of parameters in  due to
the inclusion of local market xed e¤ects.
Step 2. Instrumental variables regression of ej;t
The second step is an instrumental variable regression of the estimated xed e¤ects ej;t 
j;t   (1;t+1   t) after substituting the expressions of j;t and 1;t+1 based on (1). This
gives the regression
ej;t = (xj;t   x1;t+1)     (pj;t   p1;t+1) + ej;t (23)
where ej;t was already dened before for the aggregate model as ej;t  j;t   (1;t+1   t).
The IV regression then imposes the following moment conditions
E (zj;tej;t) = 0
Hence, this regression is very similar to the aggregate model. In the disaggregate model the
dependent variable consists of the estimated xed e¤ects ej;t from the rst step, while in
the aggregate model the dependent variable, including the correction term, was lnSj;t=S0;t 
 lnS1;t+1. Price is given by (2), based on the imposed value of , and the instruments are
the same as the ones used before in the aggregate model (though one can reduce the number
of instruments, since the discount factor is treated as known).
Simultaneous GMM
Given the known discount factor , this two-step approach yields consistent estimates of all
parameters, but in the second step standard errors need to be corrected because the ej;t are
estimated values. Alternatively, this model can be estimated at once using a GMM estimator
that combines the scores of the likelihood function of the rst step (micro-moments), with the
moment condition that is imposed by the IV regression of the second step (macro-moment).
The stacked vector of sample moment conditions is then
g(e;; ; ) =  @ lnL(e;)=@(e;)P
j;t zj;tej;t
e; ; 
!
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The score lnL(e;)=@(e;) has an intuitive expression for the demographic parameters and
the xed e¤ects:
@ lnL(e;)
@ej;t =
X
m
Nm;t

qm;j;t
Nm;t
  sm;j;t(e;)
@ lnL(e;)
@h
=
X
t
X
m
Nm;t
X
j

qm;j;t
Nm;t
  sm;j;t(e;)wm;j;tDhm
where Dhm is demographic characteristic h in the vector Dm and 
h is a K  1 vector for
demographic characteristic h (one of the columns in  ). The scores @ lnL(e;)=@ej;t (for
each j and t) are essentially conditions that the observed country-level market shares should
be equal to the predicted country-level market shares. The scores @ lnL(e;)=@h (for
each demographic h) are moment conditions that the observed sales-weighted demographic
interactions should be equal the models predictions. Since we include dummy variables for
each local market in the ow utility of a PV, it essentially also introduces a moment condition
that matches the total number of adoptions at the end of the sample predicted by the model
with that observed in the data. The GMM estimator minimizes g0Wg with respect to the
parameters, where W is the weighting matrix.
A.3.2 Estimating the discount factor 
When  is known, a two-step procedure is possible because no parameter estimated in the
second step, enters the estimation in the rst step. If  also has to be estimated, this
is no longer the case. The discount factor enters the local market shares directly as the
coe¢ cient in front of the CCP term (see (22)), but also implicitly in the interaction e¤ects of
demographic variables with the price variable. We therefore proceed with joint estimation.
The stacked vector of sample moment conditions then also depends on the discount factor
g(e;; ; ; ) =  @ lnL(e;; )=@(e;)P
j;t zj;tej;t
e; ; ; 
!
Similar to the aggregate model, we now also need an extra instrument in zj;t to identify the
discount factor.
Optimal instruments
We again make use of the approximation to optimal instruments we discussed in section
A.2. However, due to the variation of the CCP correction term across local markets, the
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error term, and therefore also the optimal set of instruments, is di¤erent. From (23) it follows
that the error term is now
ej;t(e; ; ; ) = ej;t   (xj;t   x1;t+1)  +  (pj;t()  p1;t+1()) (24)
Notice the di¤erence with (16): ej;t has replaced lnSj;t=S0;t    lnS1;t+1.Therefore the
derivative of the discount factor no longer depends on the CCP so that (25) replaces (20) in
the construction of the optimal instrument vector:
E
"
@ej;t(e; ; ; )
@
 zjt
#
= x1;t+1 (25)
+

E

@pj;t()
@
 zjt  E [p1;t+1()j zjt]  E  @p1;t+1()@
 zjt  :
Estimation details
Our main specication includes a full set of local market xed e¤ects in . We then
exclude the local markets where adoption never occurred, because with the local market
xed e¤ects these markets do not add any information to the likelihood function which we
use to construct the micro-moments of the model. To reduce the number of xed e¤ects and
speed up the estimation procedure, we use a random sample of 50%. We also estimated an
alternative specication with all local markets, but with a reduced number of 308 xed e¤ects
at the municipality level and with household characteristics interacted with the constant.
This gave similar results to the specication with a full set of local market xed e¤ects.
To correct for the fact that within a local market observations are not independent over
time, we cluster the moments in the calculation of the covariance matrix. We also cluster
the macro moments within time periods.
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